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1201 
THE PUBLIC FACE OF SCHOLARSHIP 
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN∗ 
This conference mostly has concerned scholar-bloggers’ impact on and 
relation to scholarship. This essay focuses on the relationship between 
academic weblogs, or blogs, and journalism. I see academic blogs as a 
form of what I called in a separate paper “amateur journalism.”1 I focus on 
the type of writing that is both most distinctive to scholars and connects 
most closely with professional journalism—that is, scholars’ use of blogs 
to engage with the public. Part I reviews the distinction between amateur 
and professional journalism and describes types of academic blogs. Part II 
focuses on what I call “publicly engaged academic posts,” or PEAPs, and 
discusses the changes these blogs may bring to professional journalism.  
I. SCHOLARS AS AMATEUR JOURNALISTS  
A blogger is an “amateur journalist” in the sense that she writes 
separately from her main job, which might include professional 
journalism. The distinction between amateurs and professionals focuses on 
incentives. Amateurs write mostly to express themselves and only 
secondarily for commercial reasons such as promoting their careers or 
attracting advertising. The web enables amateur journalism by permitting 
public dissemination of writing without the need for a significant capital 
investment.2 Google and other search engines allow viewers to identify 
which of the millions of websites are most useful and relevant to their 
specific interests. These technologies have fostered the proliferation of a 
large number of diverse viewpoints.  
The distinction between professional and amateur journalism assumes 
clear boundaries between vocation and avocation. This breaks down for 
scholars, whose jobs are only vaguely defined and who are usually 
insulated from termination, an employer’s most important disciplinary 
mechanism. Job security helps foster the creativity necessary for good 
teaching and scholarship. Universities control agency costs by granting 
 
 
 ∗ Mildred van Voorhis Jones Chair, University of Illinois College of Law. Blog: IdeoBlog, 
http://www.ideoblog.org.   
 1. Larry E. Ribstein, From Bricks to Pajamas: The Law and Economics of Amateur Journalism, 
48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 185 (2006). 
 2. Note that this might change if telecommunications companies were permitted to offer 
different levels of service at different prices. See James Surowiecki, Net Losses, NEW YORKER, Mar. 
20, 2006, at 74. 
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tenure only to those who demonstrate during a long probation period that 
they will use it responsibly. Tenured academics have significant leeway to 
engage in behavior that does not serve the university’s interests.  
Scholars also have more expertise than other bloggers on matters of 
general interest. Nonacademics’ expert knowledge is confined by their 
jobs. While a purchasing agent may know everything there is to know 
about the components of a line of products, the demand for this 
information may be fairly narrow, and the employee is barred from 
disclosing proprietary information. Nonacademics’ jobs usually leave 
them little time to become experts on non-work-related topics. By 
contrast, academics have significant time to devote to topics that may be 
of general interest and are not constrained from communicating the 
information by property rights or confidentiality concerns.  
In order to identify the distinct role of scholar-bloggers, it is necessary 
to identify four types of web-based writing that academics may engage in. 
Sometimes bloggers combine these types of writing on the same blog.3  
A. Recreational Expression  
Some academic blog posts are indistinguishable from nonacademics’ 
posts in the sense that they do not draw on any particular expertise. 
Academics who comment on politics, popular culture, or other subjects 
outside their specialties differ from other bloggers mainly in having more 
discretion over their time. Also, academic bloggers have the flexibility to 
merge job and hobby. For example, most of my posts on films relate to my 
scholarly project on how business is portrayed in film, now embodied in 
two more formal papers.4 Even wholly unscholarly blog posts can have the 
career benefit of building readership for more technical posts.  
B. The Blogicle 
A second type of academic blog post is essentially a short scholarly 
article that might be called a “blogicle.” These posts may present early 
versions of ideas or commentary that are too preliminary or informal to 
qualify as scholarly work. Blogicles differ from articles or essays not only 
in their length, but also in their informality, topicality, and interactivity. 
 
 
 3. Because of this potential for combination, I discuss blog posts rather than types of blogs. 
 4. See Larry E. Ribstein, Imagining Wall Street, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 165 (2006); Larry E. 
Ribstein, Wall Street & Vine: Hollywood’s View of Business (Ill. Law & Econ. Working Papers series, 
Working Paper No. LEOS-010, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=563181.  
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They include occasional links rather than extensive footnotes, are usually 
triggered by some current event or article in the professional media or 
another blog, and provide an opportunity for contemporaneous response 
through comments, trackbacks, and posts on other blogs. For example, my 
initial article on blogs5 began as a series of posts on the law and 
economics of blogging.6 More often, my posts develop ideas that I have 
first discussed elsewhere, triggered by topical news events or stories.7  
Although blogicles look different from articles, they are part of 
academics’ traditional scholarly enterprise. Indeed, they may be more 
clearly scholarship in the modern theoretical and interdisciplinary mode 
than the sort of purely descriptive articles practicing lawyers write or 
traditional doctrinal legal scholarship. Courts have cited blog posts as if 
they were scholarly writing.8 In any event, I leave blogicles to the other 
papers at this conference, noting them here mainly by way of contrast to 
PEAPs, the focus of this paper. 
C. Self-Promotion 
Academics use blogs to promote their expertise. Before blogs, scholars 
had little ability to publicize their work. Scholarly journals may reach 
most of the scholar’s fellow specialists, but they will likely not reach many 
policymakers and others to whom the work may be relevant. Blogs can 
help scholars increase the impact and value of their work, and thereby gain 
benefits that encourage scholarly work. 
Scholars have more incentive than ever to publicize their expertise. 
Rankings of educational institutions have increased the attention given to 
objective methods of evaluating institutional performance, and, therefore, 
to the reputational component of the rankings. This motivates schools to 
attract and retain scholars whose work is not only admired by other 
specialists but also widely known. In particular, an emerging objective 
measure of reputation is the number of downloads from the Social Science 
Research Network (SSRN).9 Scholars can increase downloads by linking 
 
 
 5. See Ribstein, supra note 1. 
 6. See Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2005/03/the_law_and_eco.html (Mar. 
22, 2005, 5:30 p.m.). 
 7. See, e.g., Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2005/07/a_disney_previe.html 
(July 10, 2005, 2:52 p.m.) (previewing forthcoming Delaware Chancery Court opinion in the Disney 
litigation). 
 8. See Law Blog Metrics [formerly 3L Epiphany], http://3lepiphany.typepad.com/3l_epiphany/ 
2006/08/cases_citing_le.html (Aug. 8, 2006) (collecting judicial citations to blog posts). 
 9. See Bernard S. Black & Paul L. Caron, Ranking Law Schools: Using SSRN to Measure 
Scholarly Performance, 81 IND. L.J. 83 (2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
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their articles on a widely read blog. This gives schools an incentive to 
subsidize or even run blogs.10  
Blogs fill a significant gap in existing mechanisms for promoting 
scholarship. Merely listing a paper’s title on a resume or on SSRN often 
does not really communicate what the article is about. Even the abstract 
can only convey a general idea and not how the paper relates to specific 
issues. More importantly, there is the problem of bringing the title or 
abstract to the attention of potential readers. Even if the article appears in 
the right databases, it may become a needle in the burgeoning haystack of 
academic literature. SSRN-abstracting journals are an effective means of 
promotion, but they reach readers only at one point in the paper’s life. 
Blogs can push the article repeatedly to visitors who have demonstrated 
some interest in the scholar’s work. Moreover, a blog can illustrate the 
article’s relevance to issues that currently interest these readers. For 
example, my blog posts on my paper on outsider trading11 discuss the 
various subjects the paper covers.12 Some of these would not be obvious 
from a title, abstract, or cursory review. 
D. Scholarly Public Engagement 
This paper highlights a particular type of academic blogging that uses 
the blogger’s scholarly work as a mechanism for public engagement. I call 
these “publicly engaged academic posts,” or PEAPs.13 The authors of 
PEAPs are not engaging simply in original scholarly analysis or self-
expression, but rather are trying to use their expertise to influence the 
outcome of a public debate. They may be aiming for some particular 
public policy result or to rebut the political or policy arguments made by 
politicians, interest groups, journalists, or other bloggers. A recent 
 
 
cfm?abstract_id=784764; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Scholarly Profit Margins and the Legal 
Scholarship Network: Reflections on the Web, 81 IND. L.J. 271 (2006), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=695283. 
 10. See Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/04/should_law_scho.html (Apr. 5, 
2006, 9:32 a.m.). 
 11. Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Outsider Trading as an Incentive Device, 40 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 21 (2006). 
 12. See, e.g., Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/03/the_attack_on_t_1.html 
(Mar. 26, 2006, 10:55 a.m.); Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/03/prediction_ 
mark.html (Mar. 19, 2006, 8:27 a.m.).  
 13. Because this writing may appear on the same blogs with the other types of writing discussed 
above, I am characterizing specific posts rather than entire blogs. Blogs do differ, however, as to the 
extent to which each type of post dominates. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/18
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example on my blog is a series of posts on the SEC’s proposed rule on 
executive compensation disclosure.14 
PEAPs’ significance as a distinct category of amateur journalism is that 
they connect both with journalism and scholarship. While PEAPs involve 
the same sort of activity as professional journalism, scholar-journalists 
gain an advantage over professionals by leveraging their expertise. This 
has three implications. First, the posts are more informed than other blogs 
that engage in self-expression. Scholars can draw from their expertise to 
make immediate and timely posts without engaging in the significant new 
research that generalist journalists would have to perform. Second, the 
post is likely to be more disciplined and objective than other self-
expressive blogs because it derives from a body of prior ideas developed 
without specific public policy objectives. Third, the blogger stakes her 
scholarly reputation on the post, and therefore has more incentive than 
other amateurs to carefully support her position.15 These differences 
between PEAPs and other forms of amateur journalism relate to the impact 
PEAPs may have on the nature and quality of professional journalism, as 
discussed in Part II. 
II. PEAPS’ EFFECT ON PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS 
This Part discusses how PEAPs are likely to affect professional 
journalism. Subpart A discusses the equilibrium that existed prior to the 
rise of blogs—that is, the power of professional journalists to control 
access to the public debate. Subpart B examines the incentives and biases 
of professional journalists. Subpart C considers the potential effects of 
academic blogging on professional journalism, including the implications 
for the relationship between academics and journalists.  
A. The Power of Professional Journalists 
Speakers’ access to an audience depends on their resources. 
Professional journalists and editors traditionally have had significant 
 
 
 14. See Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/executive_compensation/index.html.  
 15. These characteristics of PEAPs differentiate them from Posner’s “public intellectuals.” See 
RICHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE (2003). Posner criticized a 
relatively small group of famous intellectuals for a variety of flaws, including conflicts of interest and 
sloppy thinking. I envision a large number of PEAPs authors, each with only a small audience (though 
perhaps collectively influential), who stick fairly closely to their fields of expertise and academic 
roots. As noted in the text, this is likely to have a payoff in accuracy and responsibility. Although a 
detailed application of Posner’s theory is beyond the scope of this short paper, it is worth noting that 
PEAPs might correct the deficiencies of public intellectuals as well as those of professional journalists. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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power to control participation in public debate through their ability to 
direct their employers’ resources. A journalist who works for the New 
York Times may have a louder voice in the public debate than a non-
journalist, a journalist for a smaller newspaper, or even some politicians. 
While these journalists may let others speak through their articles or 
broadcasts, they select the speakers and edit their speech.16 
The web has the potential to change all of this by giving amateurs 
direct access to the public. Access, of course, still is not “free,” since the 
web does not alter fundamental limitations on consumers’ attention. But 
blogs enable amateurs to reach a significant audience without the sort of 
capital investments that professionals have. Amateurs can enter the market 
with no capital investment and increase their prominence by investing 
time.17 While relatively few amateurs ultimately might succeed in 
capturing significant attention, their success is determined through a 
decentralized process rather than through a professional institutional 
framework. As discussed below, this may have important implications for 
the types of views that achieve prominence in the public debate.  
B. Professional Journalists’ Incentives 
In order to determine how PEAPs may affect journalism, it is important 
first to analyze professional journalists’ incentives in a world without 
PEAPs. These have been modeled and tested empirically in several articles 
in the finance literature. There are basically two theories, which can be 
referred to as “demand-side,” originating from journalists’ effort to give 
the audience what it wants, and “supply-side,” originating from 
journalists’ biases.  
1. Demand-Based Theories  
Michael Jensen propounded the first “market” or demand-side theory 
of journalist incentives.18 Jensen characterizes consumers of news as 
 
 
 16. Corporations and interest groups similarly can command the resources necessary to 
disseminate their views to a large audience and, therefore, play a significant role in the public debate. 
For an analysis of the political implications of corporations’ power to engage in political debate, see 
Larry E. Ribstein, Corporate Political Speech, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 109 (1992). 
 17. Blogs such as Huffington (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/) make significant investments in 
publicity in order to reach a substantial audience. But these are much more like professional outlets. 
Although the writers themselves are amateurs in the sense that their activity is a sidelight to their main 
careers, professionals handle promotion and coordination. These blogs are, in effect, professional 
journals consisting exclusively of op-ed pages.  
 18. Michael C. Jensen, Toward a Theory of the Press, in ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/18
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maximizing their self-interest and journalists as serving this market. More 
specifically, people look to news for entertainment. People have little 
incentive to invest in information that would guide their voting decisions 
because they do not expect to affect voting outcomes.19 Quoting 
extensively from H.L. Mencken, Jensen says the audience for news (whom 
Mencken refers to as “boobs”) want sensationalist stories that present 
choices between good and evil and simple solutions rather than complex 
explanations. They prefer stories about “evil men with evil motives [who] 
pervert the system for their own ends,”20 or stories that say that people are 
bad because the system causes them to act selfishly. Journalists meet this 
demand by first scaring people with a problem and then offering a 
reassuring solution. Journalists accordingly ally with politicians, scientists, 
and others who are interested in creating crises for which they can offer 
solutions.  
There is evidence supporting Jensen’s market theory of journalists’ 
incentives. Core, Guay, and Larcker track press reports relating to 
executive compensation.21 While they show that the press provides some 
information, some of their data supports an entertainment theory. The 
authors show that negative press reports tend to concern option exercises 
and equity and option holdings rather than annual pay, and the reports are 
more negative for large firms and firms that perform poorly. Both of these 
findings indicate that the press opts for sensationalism over reporting that 
would reveal the extent of the excessive compensation problem. Equity 
holdings and option exercises tend to exaggerate the compensation 
executives are actually receiving. Large and poorly performing firms tend 
to be more newsworthy, but are not necessarily indicative of an excessive 
compensation problem.  
Along similar lines, Gregory Miller describes the factors that determine 
which accounting frauds journalists will cover.22 The press is more likely 
to write about accounting frauds where managers have also made 
misleading statements or misappropriated money, both of which make the 
story more sensational. Also, the press is likely to focus on firms that are 
larger and have more analysts following them. These choices reflect the 
 
 
(Karl Brunner ed., 1979), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=94038. 
 19. ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957). 
 20. Id. at 8. 
 21. John E. Core, Wayne Guay & David F. Larcker, The Power of the Pen and Executive 
Compensation (Oct. 28, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=838347. 
 22. Gregory S. Miller, The Press as a Watchdog for Accounting Fraud, 44 J. ACCT. RES. 1001 
(2006), available at http://www.nd.edu/~carecob/Workshops/Miller.pdf. 
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story’s entertainment value, rather than necessarily the severity of the 
fraud in terms of its length or the number of violations. 
Other scholars have proposed theories of professional journalists’ 
incentives based on the market’s demand for biased information rather 
than for entertainment. Gentzkow and Shapiro argue that the news media 
seek to build a reputation for high-quality and accurate information, but 
understand that the audience faces limitations in evaluating whether they 
are receiving such information.23 Consumers will act like Bayesians and 
evaluate the accuracy of each new piece of information in the context of 
what they already know. If a news account differs too much from their 
existing information, readers will conclude that it is inaccurate and lower 
their evaluation of the media delivering it. The media’s incentive to deliver 
accurate information accordingly depends on what the audience learns 
from other sources; these other sources determine the expectations that the 
media must meet. If the information is immediately verifiable, as with 
sports or weather, expectations, and therefore reporting, are likely to be 
accurate. However, such feedback may not be much of a corrective for 
business regulation, the effect of which may be unclear. Significant market 
competition may give the media an incentive to provide alternative views, 
which also may determine audience expectations. This has implications 
for the role of PEAPs and other blogs. 
Mullainathan and Shleifer24 also argue that journalists serve a market 
demand for biased information. However, this theory attributes bias to 
audience attitudes rather than Bayesian updating. Since the authors assume 
that more information alone does not change individuals’ beliefs, neither 
real-world feedback nor media competition can readily cause the audience 
to demand accurate information. Competition merely provides more 
outlets serving existing audience biases. However, Mullainathan and 
Shleifer assume that some readers demand accurate information and 
satisfy this demand by aggregating diverse biased sources. It follows that 
the more heterogeneous audience beliefs are, the more different news 
outlets will serve these preferences and the more aggregate accuracy there 
will be.  
 
 
 23. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, Media Bias and Reputation, 114 J. POL. ECON. 280 
(2006). 
 24. Sendhil Mullainathan & Andrei Shleifer, The Market for News, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1031 
(2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=485724. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/18
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2. The Supply Side: Journalist Bias  
David Baron argues media bias is a product of journalist attitudes.25 
Baron argues that those who choose to become journalists have a leftward, 
anti-market bias that they wish to express in their stories. Because of their 
preference for self-expression, they are willing to trade the higher wages 
they could earn in jobs like advertising for positions with more 
opportunities for self-expression. On the other hand, consumers of news 
demand accuracy because they use the information to make decisions. 
Biased reporting may therefore reduce prices and profits. News 
organizations have an incentive to give journalists license to express 
themselves if the resulting decrease in wages journalists demand exceeds 
the decline in the price consumers are willing to pay for biased reporting. 
Competition may not reduce overall bias and may even increase it by 
giving news organizations an incentive to reduce prices and therefore to 
reduce wages by giving journalists more freedom. Moreover, as prices 
drop, more people consume news and therefore more are exposed to 
biased reporting.  
Although Baron cites evidence of leftward bias among professional 
journalists,26 he does not fully explain why this bias would exist. Such an 
explanation is obviously important to analyzing how PEAPs might change 
the equilibrium. There are four potential reasons for journalist bias. First, 
only certain types of people may choose journalism as a profession. As 
Baron explains, these people are willing to trade the higher earnings they 
would make in professions like advertising that give their employees less 
freedom. For example, one recent story about continued interest in 
journalism school despite the financial woes of newspapers quotes a 
journalism student as saying, “You don’t go into this profession to get rich 
. . . . There are financial sacrifices, it’s a tough profession, you’re under 
fire, and it’s not necessarily the most popular thing to say you’re a 
journalist . . . . But it’s a calling.”27 But journalists’ willingness to trade 
money for the privilege of engaging in a “calling” does not imply 
 
 
 25. David Baron, Persistent Media Bias (Stanford Graduate Sch. of Bus., Research Paper No. 
1845, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=516006. 
 26. Baron relies on Groseclose & Milyo. See Tim Groseclose & Jeffrey Milyo, A Measure of 
Media Bias, 120 Q.J. ECON. 1191 (2005), available at http://economics.missouri.edu/Working_Paper_ 
Series/2005/wp0501_milyo.pdf (based on citation analysis, finding liberal bias of all major news 
outlets examined except Fox News and Washington Times). 
 27. Katharine Q. Seelye, Times Are Tough for News Media, but Journalism Schools Are Still 
Booming, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2006, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/15/ 
business/media/15students.html.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 1201 Ribstein book pages.doc9/24/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
1210 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1201 
 
 
 
 
particular views, such as a preference for more regulation and bigger 
government. Perhaps those who are willing to work for less money than 
people with similar training are more critical of the institutions, such as 
markets, that provide these higher rewards. In other words, they may view 
themselves as outsiders. Also, as Schumpeter has argued about the 
“intelligentsia” generally, journalists may share resentment directed at a 
society that refuses to value what they do.28  
A second possible explanation for professional journalists’ anti-market 
bias is the institutional structure associated with the journalism profession. 
All professions seek market advantage through privileges enforced by 
government.29 Professional journalists may have, or seek, special 
protections under the First Amendment, are shielded under state law from 
revealing sources, and are protected from defamation liability by state 
retraction laws. The fact that journalists work for large corporations might 
seem to be in tension with these privileges. Thus, in order to demonstrate 
their entitlement to special status and protection, journalists could be 
expected to see and portray themselves as critics of powerful market 
institutions. 
A third explanation for journalists’ bias relates to the second: the 
institutions of professional journalism screen the people who are admitted 
to the profession. They may do so either by discouraging those with views 
that differ from the prevailing orthodoxy from seeking to be journalists or 
by actively preventing entry and advancement by those with right-of-
center views. 
Fourth, some of the leftward bias may stem from the owners of 
professional media organizations. Some leading firms, such as the New 
York Times Co., Washington Post Co., and Dow Jones, are controlled by 
the founding families. These devices are intended to preserve a particular 
managerial philosophy distinct from pure profit maximization. Although 
this does not dictate a particular set of views, it may reinforce the slant of 
other institutions of professional journalism discussed above. 
Journalists’ bias can help shape public policy. Where interest groups 
are closely divided, the outcome of political battles may depend on how 
 
 
 28. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 145–55 (3d ed. 
1950). Note that it might also be the case that journalists resent capitalists because the latter control the 
papers they work for. For an analogous theory of the anti-capitalist content of U.S. films, see Ribstein, 
Wall Street & Vine, supra note 4. 
 29. See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 145 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner eds., 1976) (“People of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the 
publick, or in some contrivance to raise prices.”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/18
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much voter support each side can enlist. This may depend on how 
journalists have portrayed the issue to the public. For example, the press is 
an important influence on corporate governance.30 One factor in the rapid 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the strongest federal financial 
regulation in seventy years, may have been the overwhelmingly negative 
coverage of business in the first half of 2002: seventy-seven percent of the 
613 major network evening news stories on business concerned corporate 
scandals.31  
There is direct evidence that the media can influence public opinion. A 
study found that, where individuals were randomly selected to receive free 
subscriptions to one of two newspapers with differing political slants or no 
subscription, those assigned to the liberal paper were eight percentage 
points more likely to vote for the Democratic candidate for governor in the 
local state election than those who did not receive a subscription.32  
Journalists’ effect is indirectly indicated by evidence that corruption 
declined when growth of the press made it more independent from 
politicians.33 When journalists could make more money selling 
newspapers than selling out to corrupt politicians, they became an 
independent voice against corruption. Indeed, press campaigns against 
corruption have been associated with the defeat of corrupt politicians. A 
corollary of this theory is that increased press power meant not only less 
power for politicians but more power for journalists. Baron’s theory 
suggests that journalists may use this power not only to root out corrupt 
politicians, but to encourage adoption of their preferred policy outcomes. 
The press can influence individuals’ behavior in ways other than voting 
that affect the level or impact of government regulation. Press reports 
about drug or tobacco companies and other tort defendants or about greed 
and misconduct by corporate executives can influence jury verdicts. It is 
plausible that the verdicts against Ken Lay and Jeffrey Skilling in the 
 
 
 30. See Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Governance Role of the Media 
(CRSP Working Paper, Paper No. 543, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=335602. 
 31. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1559 (2005) (discussing data compiled by the Media Research 
Center). 
 32. Alan Gerber, Dean Karlan & Daniel Bergan, Does the Media Matter? A Field Experiment 
Measuring the Effect of Newspapers on Voting Behavior and Political Opinions (Yale Working Papers 
on Economics and Policy, Discussion Paper No. 12, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
903812. 
 33. Matthew Gentzkow, Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin, The Rise of the Fourth Estate: 
How Newspapers Became Informative and Why it Mattered (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working 
Paper No. 10791, 2005), available at http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~goldin/papers/GGG_CR.pdf.  
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Enron case owed something to the negative post-Enron coverage of 
businesses, particularly in Enron’s hometown of Houston.  
Journalists’ effect on public opinion may, in turn, influence corporate 
behavior. Firms might alter their conduct as a result of press reports to 
avoid liability or regulation. For example, there is evidence that firms 
reduce the efficiency of their compensation schemes in response to press 
distortions of compensation practices.34 
One problem with the journalist bias theory is that it may be hard to 
determine whether news coverage that is slanted to a particular version of 
reality reflects journalists’ personal attitudes or their efforts to meet market 
demand for information consistent with the theories discussed in the 
preceding subsection. Tyler Cowen argues that what looks like journalist 
bias is often just the media’s effort to find the most entertaining story.35 
For example, U.S. military prowess and heroism was a story that would 
sell during the early stages of the Iraq war, whereas the more engaging 
story in the aftermath was more likely to be suicide bombers than military 
efforts to rebuild. The press packaged the O.J. Simpson trial as a 
continuing story that engaged viewers. The Enron trial and other corporate 
criminal prosecutions serve the same goal. However, there may be many 
potential stories with various political slants that would engage readers. 
For example, there is no obvious reason why viewers would not be 
engaged by “feel-good” stories of rebuilding in Iraq and turned off by 
repetitive and gloomy stories of violence. 
3. An Illustration 
A column by New York Times columnist Gretchen Morgenson 
illustrates the above theories.36 Morgenson’s lead concerns a purportedly 
overpaid executive, in this case Pfizer CEO Henry McKinnell, who 
received $65 million in total compensation over a five-year period in 
which the stock lost forty-three percent of its value, and who stands to 
receive an $83 million pension benefit when he retires in 2008. Since this 
amount reflects eight years of increases in Pfizer shares, it exemplifies the 
practice documented by Core, Guay, and Larcker of sensationalizing 
compensation by emphasizing one-time equity and option distributions 
 
 
 34. See Core et al., supra note 21. 
 35. Posting of Tyler Cowen to TCS Daily, http://www.tcsdaily.com/article.aspx?id=111103A 
(Nov. 11, 2003). 
 36. See Gretchen Morgenson, Fund Manager, It’s Time to Pick a Side, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 
2006, at C1, available at http://select.nytimes.com/2006/03/26/business/yourmoney/26gret.html. 
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rather than annual pay. Morgenson offers no information that would 
enable the reader to evaluate whether the pay was scaled to performance or 
industry benchmarks, other than comments that the pay was “munificent” 
and received despite McKinnell’s presiding over the “destruction of 
shareholder value.” To build reader interest in the story, Morgenson 
quotes a shareholder activist (the chairman of the Texas Pension Review 
Board) as saying, “Managers and their friends have done well while future 
retirees, endowments, universities, museums, widows and orphans have 
broken even, if they are lucky. This is not a coincidence.” Although this is 
alarming, and therefore engaging, it does not tell us why retirement funds 
would have gone down in the rising stock market that boosted 
McKinnell’s “munificent” pay. 
Consistent with Jensen’s analysis, the Morgenson article concludes 
with a simple solution to the problem: institutional shareholders need to be 
more vigilant. They have not been vigilant enough, according to 
Morgenson, because they are paid to manage the funds of companies in 
which they also hold stock on behalf of clients. The story does not attempt 
to measure the dimensions of the conflict of interest, such as by comparing 
trustee fees with earnings from non-trustee businesses that depend on how 
the funds are performing. These complications would distract from the 
flow of the story and make it too long to digest with brunch. All we need 
to know is that a corporate election is coming up in which institutional 
investors can force Pfizer’s compensation committee chair to resign by 
withholding votes from that director. The article concludes, “We’ll keep 
you posted on the outcome of this exercise in accountability.” This primes 
the reader for the next installment. 
Although Morgenson’s slant is largely consistent with the 
entertainment theory of journalism of Jensen and others, it can also fit 
alternative explanations: the press’s desire to appear accurate by meeting 
reader expectations, an effort to serve the largely left-leaning audience of 
the New York Times with a tale of executive greed and corporate laxity, or 
Morgenson’s own biases along these lines. The important point for present 
purposes is that journalists’ tendency to lean in the same direction can 
influence the public debate on corporate governance and executive 
compensation. The question discussed in the next subpart is the effect of 
blogs in general, and PEAPs in particular, on this bias. 
C. PEAPs’ Effect on Professional Journalism 
The effect that scholar-bloggers may have on professional news 
coverage depends to some extent on whether news media biases flow from 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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market demand or from journalists’ own biases. In either case, the addition 
to the market of an important source of expert opinions is likely to have 
some impact on the current equilibrium.  
1. Demand-Side Incentives 
The theories of journalist bias discussed in Subpart B include various 
assumptions about audience demand that allow for different opportunities 
for PEAPs to affect the market. To the extent that the audience’s demand 
for information is not affected by what they read or view, blogs will have 
to offer a product similar to that of the mainstream media and, therefore, 
ultimately may have little effect on content.  
Even under this assumption, the information derived from blogs and 
other sources may play an important role. First, professional news media 
may often have choices among alternative types of entertaining stories. 
The market’s preferences for particular types of information or journalist 
bias could enter into those choices in ways discussed in this and the 
following subsection.  
Second, there may be a greater demand for information than Jensen and 
other theorists assume. While individuals may have little incentive to 
acquire voting-related information, they do, as Baron hypothesizes, need 
the information in news stories to make personal decisions such as which 
consumer goods and stocks to buy. Journalists have an incentive to pitch 
their stories to appeal to these more immediate needs. For example, stories 
about excessive executive compensation are not just about how or whether 
the government should regulate it, but about whether employees should 
work where executives are overpaid or whether investors should entrust 
greedy managers with their money. If people think the information is 
biased or inaccurate they will have less demand for it. Also, an influential, 
even if small, audience of regulators, legislators, academics, journalists, 
and others demand accurate information relating to public policy. And the 
demand for information relating to public policy may be broader than 
Jensen supposes. He relies heavily on the observations by H.L. Mencken 
in the early twentieth century, a time when the American public was much 
less broadly educated than it is today.  
To the extent that the audience demands information, it is not clear 
how additional competition might affect this demand. Gentzkow and 
Shapiro argue that market bias depends on how much information the 
audience receives directly and from competing information sources. For 
example, they show that adding a television station to a market produces a 
statistically significant reduction in bias. Gentzkow and Shapiro argue that 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol84/iss5/18
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this supports limiting consolidation of ownership of media sources in news 
markets.  
Mullainathan and Shleifer say that, while people generally seek 
information that fits their biases, there are “conscientious” readers and 
viewers who want objective information. While adding more news will not 
persuade the biased audiences that are already being served, the authors 
suggest that political entrepreneurs might, in effect, instill new biases that 
new competitors might serve. More importantly for present purposes, they 
see the possibility of “entrepreneurs starting newspapers on their own and, 
so long as they have deep enough pockets, creating enough demand for 
unorthodox views to broaden the range of opinions (and slants) that are 
being covered.”37 This can enrich the information available to 
conscientious readers. But the authors are skeptical these entrepreneurs 
will make much difference because “without a broad political sentiment to 
support it, newspaper publishing is likely to be a money losing 
proposition.”38  
The main question for present purposes concerns blogs’ potential effect 
on this competitive equilibrium. In the Gentzkow-Shapiro framework, 
blogs, including PEAPs, can create different audience expectations and 
increase the demand for unbiased information. Indeed, web-based 
information may reduce any effect of media consolidation and, therefore, 
the need to regulate it.39 Under Mullainathan and Shleifer, blogs can serve 
micromarkets because they cost so little to produce. Thus, blogs might 
serve reader biases that are too narrowly held to justify additional high-
cost newspapers. This enriches the information available both to these 
groups and to the conscientious readers who scan the entire market.  
PEAPs may have a particularly important effect on the market. 
Because PEAPs are based on work that is subject to scholarly standards of 
care and objectivity, PEAPs may carry more weight than other blogs. This 
is especially significant under the Gentzkow and Shapiro assumption that 
readers are Bayesians continually updating their assumptions. Even under 
Mullainathan and Shleifer’s assumption that readers generally cling to 
their biases, readers may vary in their resistance to facts. If that is true, a 
wider range of readers might be persuaded by the more objective and 
credible information in PEAPs than by more biased blog posts.  
 
 
 37. Mullainathan & Shleifer, supra note 24, at 20.  
 38. Id.  
 39. See Ribstein, supra note 1, at 227–28. 
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2. Supply-Side Incentives  
Under Baron’s theory, even if the market demands useful information, 
journalists do not supply it because they are biased. It follows that more 
objective information from alternative sources may significantly affect the 
audience’s views. However, this can happen only if scholar-bloggers’ 
incentives and biases differ from those of professional journalists. Also, 
professional journalists may have special competitive advantages that 
would enable them to compete successfully with blogs for readers even if 
the audience demanded more objective reporting.  
Academic bloggers resemble professional journalists to the extent that 
they have decided to forego more remunerative activities like writing 
books, writing articles, and consulting for the freedom to express 
themselves and influence public debate. This suggests that their views 
might be similar to those of professional journalists. However, there are 
several important differences between the two groups. 
First, PEAP authors do not make the same sort of career decisions that 
professional journalists do. Academic blogging can be remunerative to the 
extent that it builds reputations and carries advertising. Academics may 
combine public engagement with these other activities. Indeed, public 
engagement can itself be a kind of promotion. Moreover, even if 
academics are engaged in pure public service, their opportunity costs may 
be low because they are doing it as, or instead of, a hobby rather than 
taking time away from remunerative activities. Thus, the decision to blog 
does not imply any particular views.  
Second, unlike the professional media, PEAPs do not emerge from an 
institutional structure that encourages any particular point of view. PEAP 
writers are essentially freelancers who have in common only their decision 
to work on their own rather than through some larger institutional 
structure. Academia’s institutions bind neither bloggers in general nor 
publicly engaged bloggers in particular. Indeed, PEAPs authors may have 
an extra incentive to engage in their activity precisely in order to express 
opposition to the prevailing academic establishment. 
Third, PEAPs are not subject to any ownership structure that imparts or 
reinforces particular institutions. Rather, they are owned by authors who 
seek only to express their views and not to use financial resources to 
leverage their influence. 
Apart from whether PEAPs are subject to bias, it is also significant 
that, as hobbyists with minimal capital investments, PEAP authors are not 
subject to the same market pressures as professional journalists. Gentzkow 
and Shapiro argue that the professional media must cater to the 
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expectations of the general audience or risk losing credibility. Scholars, on 
the other hand, are free to reach conclusions that diverge from the 
generally accepted wisdom. Their reputations depend on the evaluations of 
their fellow scholars, which are based on facts different from those that 
shape the opinions of the general public.  
Assuming PEAPs authors’ incentives and biases differ from those of 
professional journalists, bloggers may affect what professional journalists 
say if they offer meaningful competition to the professional media. Before 
PEAPs and other academic blogs, scholars could speak to the public only 
through professional journalists. As Jensen has pointed out, journalists, 
prevented by trade ethics from inserting their own opinions in straight 
reporting, seek quotations from experts, including academics.40 These 
quotations lend credibility to reports by nonexpert journalists. Baron also 
notes that journalists’ bias can determine their choice of particular 
quotations.41 Professional journalists induce scholars to cooperate by 
offering them significant exposure that can produce professional 
rewards.42 Scholars accordingly have had an incentive to tailor their views 
and how they express them to match what journalists want to say. For 
example, academics may be willing to boil complex topics down to 
soundbites, and to portray them as the kind of serious problems with clear 
solutions that the professional journalists think their readers want to read. 
PEAPs potentially enable scholars to express their views directly to the 
public rather than going through the professional journalists who solicit 
their quotations. Scholars can focus on categories of specialty knowledge 
that would be too narrow for professional journalists who cater to large 
markets. They can also add depth and complexity that professional 
journalists, seeking to entertain, may want to avoid. For example, I 
included the above analysis of the Morgenson article43 on my blog.44 And, 
through PEAPs, scholars can directly confront professional journalists 
who distort or misinterpret their quotations.45  
The problem with this scenario is that an academic blog cannot hope 
for more than a small fraction of the audience of the large professional 
 
 
 40. See Jensen, supra note 18, at 6. 
 41. See Baron, supra note 25, at 8.  
 42. See Jensen, supra note 18, at 15. 
 43. See supra text accompanying note 36.  
 44. See Ideoblog, http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2006/03/more_entertainm.html (Mar. 
27, 2006, 8:42 p.m.). 
 45. See Adam Smith, Esq., http://www.bmacewen.com/blog/archives/2006/02/the_blogosphere. 
html (Feb. 15, 2006).  
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outlets.46 Building a huge web audience requires promotion and staff 
resources that are beyond the reach of any amateur journalist. Even if 
some amateur journalists might be able to develop substantial audiences, 
the audience for academic experts who write within their specialties is 
limited.  
On the other hand, the professional media might be concerned about 
competition from blogs as a whole rather than any single blog. Through 
news aggregators readers can, in effect, assemble their own newspapers by 
automatically pulling in the feeds from many blogs. Also, criticism of 
particular media outlets can spread rapidly through the web and have a 
significant cumulative impact, as happened with CBS and Rathergate. If 
PEAPs and other blogs can effectively compete with the professional 
media, the professional outlets have an incentive to respond by changing 
their content. Under Baron’s theory, this could mean that they will reduce 
their reporters’ and editors’ discretion. The professional media might hire 
journalists from outside the “guild,” including amateur journalists. Indeed, 
they may be forced to do so if they are unable to offer professional 
journalists a high enough wage to compensate them for any loss of 
freedom of expression. 
Professional journalists may, however, be able to compete successfully 
against blogs even if they remain biased and the audience demands 
objectivity. The professional media can bundle biased reporting with 
features readers demand and cannot get from amateurs. Consumers may 
continue to prefer that their news be delivered in paper or other physical 
form even as web access becomes ubiquitous. Physical delivery requires 
capital investments that are beyond amateurs’ reach. Even if the web 
replaces physical delivery, consumers may prefer to forego search costs 
and, in effect, buy from the professional media the service of choosing, 
aggregating, and vouching for all of the types of information consumers 
want, including entertainment reviews, classified pages and other 
advertising information, sports scores, recipes, bridge advice, and comics. 
The professional media can shape the demand for this bundled product 
through advertising, promotion, and other mechanisms for creating 
goodwill. They can use their most popular features to promote other parts 
of the bundle. The professional media’s resources enable them to invest in 
popular writers and branded syndicated features. Consumers therefore may 
be willing to continue to buy biased reporting because they get offsetting 
 
 
 46. A Technorati graph from January 2006 shows the significant spread in terms of links 
between the most popular blogs, such as the Daily Kos, and the mainstream media. Blogs and MSM-
January 2006, http://www.sifry.com/alerts/Slide0005-8.gif (last visited Feb. 3, 2007). 
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benefits from the overall product. Even if consumers supplement their 
reading with blogs, they may continue to be influenced by professional 
reporting.  
Journalism might evolve into a hybrid in which neither professional nor 
amateur journalism clearly dominates. Professional media may add to their 
bundles blog-like features for the readers who would otherwise defect to 
blogs. Indeed, many newspapers already have blogs on their websites that 
combine professional writing and reporting with interactivity.47 This might 
carry over to the rest of the newspaper, with each story providing a point 
of connection with reader commentary and blogs. Or current forms of 
professional media might be replaced by professionally managed group 
blogs.  
Some dividing line between professional and amateur media is likely to 
remain. For example, professionals by definition will have more resources 
than academics to report on facts.48 Conversely, bloggers, particularly 
authors of PEAPs, will continue to offer more specialized expertise than 
the mass media can offer.  
Whatever the outcome of the competition between professionals and 
amateurs, as long as the market demands accurate information and 
objective reporting, blogs in general, and PEAPs in particular, likely will 
have a long-term effect on professional reporting. Journalists may find 
that, in order to compete with blogs, they will have to become less biased, 
more informal and interactive, and more open to diverse views. After 
being exposed to blogs, consumers might discover tastes for less bias and 
entertainment and more facts. Academic commentary, including 
academics’ critiques of specific stories by professional journalists, might 
raise readers’ expectations about the depth of reporting.  
Even if PEAPs and other blogs ultimately are unable to effectively 
compete with professional journalists, they may alter professional 
journalist biases by publicly challenging these journalists’ views. Glenn 
Reynolds has observed that mainstream journalists surf the web and “like 
to read about themselves and their colleagues. This means that blog 
criticism may have a more immediate impact than might otherwise be the 
case.”49 Since journalists have always gotten letters (and now e-mails) 
 
 
 47. See, e.g., The Wall Street Journal Online, Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/. 
 48. For example, Marty Lederman in a comment on Volokh.com, discussing the issue of whether 
reporters should, and do, credit blogs, says, “The real issue that should obsess journalists is not 
‘breaking’ a story, but filling it out with important details and making it come alive in a way that 
would be impossible on a blog.” Posting of M. Lederman to The Volokh Conspiracy, 
http://volokh.com/posts/1143503636.shtml#76774 (Mar. 27, 2006, 6:46 p.m.). 
 49. GLENN REYNOLDS, AN ARMY OF DAVIDS 92 (2006). 
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from readers, it is not obvious why blog criticism should be more effective 
just because it is on the Web, unless journalists perceive it as competition. 
Perhaps professional journalists recognize that they are particularly 
vulnerable to criticism by experts and need the credibility these experts 
provide. Journalists might therefore be susceptible to criticism by scholars 
that is circulated in the academic community even if these blogs never 
significantly erode professional journalists’ overall audience.  
Finally, PEAPs’ effect on professional journalism depends to some 
extent on the audience’s view of the authoritativeness and objectivity of 
PEAPs’ analyses. If readers perceive that PEAPs do not offer significant 
advantages in this regard over the professional media, they might stick 
with these traditional sources. Thus, PEAPs’ effect on professional 
journalism ultimately may depend on how they affect scholarship. If 
PEAPs lure academics away from traditional scholarship and into full-time 
public engagement, this might undermine PEAPs’ distinctiveness—that is, 
it may blur the line between PEAPs and the undisciplined self-expression 
of nonscholar amateur journalists.50 On the other hand, PEAPs might 
increase the incentives to do scholarship. Public engagement not only 
increases scholars’ influence on public policy, but, more tangibly, may 
attract offers for lucrative private or government consulting or expert 
work. Thus, the opportunity to engage publicly may offer scholars a way 
to capitalize on, and thereby increase the value of, traditional scholarship, 
just as entrepreneurs’ ability to cash into public securities markets 
supports business formation.  
III. CONCLUSION 
Scholars increasingly are becoming amateur journalists. To some 
extent they are like all other bloggers, only with more time and flexibility. 
Some scholar-blogs may be just another version of scholarship. But 
scholars also make a unique contribution to amateur journalism by using 
blogs as a form of public engagement. The result is a potentially high-
value form of journalism, the PEAP, that may help both reshape 
professional journalism and motivate traditional scholarship. Blogs thus 
may enable academics to climb down from the ivory tower, while bringing 
some of their purer air with them. 
 
 
 50. Blogs may tempt scholars into some of the flaws Posner, supra note 15, attributes to “public 
intellectuals.” 
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